Laboratory Safety Incidents: Autoclaves
Autoclave Explosions
(top)
Unexplained Autoclave
Explosion (top)
One morning there was a sudden blast which had laboratory personnel headed for the
door. Before too long it was determined that an autoclave had ruptured with incredibly
violent force. The room was trashed, broken water connections were streaming and
electrical panels were severely damaged. Racks of test tubes, stacks of culture media and
trays of used needles awaiting sterilization prior to disposal were splattered across the
room by the tremendous concussion. Metal shrapnel penetrated the walls. (Photo) A few minutes sooner or later and those
projectiles could have easily struck a lab worker. Luckily, the room was unoccupied at the
critical moment.
EHS shut off electrical power, stopped the water flow and quickly surveyed the
seriousness of the situation. Next, they verified through visual smoke testing that
hazardous biological materials had not blown into the corridors, contaminated building
occupants, or escaped to the outside environment. Two things seemed to have prevented this
outcome. First, when the 80 lb sterilizer door blew off its hinges and slammed against the
wall, it hit the back of well anchored electrical panels which kept it from sailing right
through to the corridor. If that was luck, the second advantage was the result of specific
design. The autoclave room was independently exhausted, which prevented airborne materials
from spreading throughout the building ventilation system. Another concern was the
collection of debris, biological waste materials and flood water which covered the floor.
EHS and lab personnel helped estimate possible risks presented by the inventory of
likely pathogens. Worst fears were gradually replaced by the carefully considered
judgments of some of the country's most knowledgeable professionals.
Although relieved to confirm that human and environmental contamination was prevented
by local circumstances, the mess was still extremely hazardous and needed to be cleared as
quickly as possible. A clean-up vendor was on the scene before the end of the day. By
dawn, eleven drums of contaminated debris were collected from the room - even the
contaminated drywall was removed. The only things remaining were three autoclaves and the
faint smell of biocide residues.
What caused this catastrophic mechanical failure? Could it happen again elsewhere on
campus? Steris was notified and their technicians began inspecting all other steam
sterilizers at the facility. All the other units in need of repair and maintenance were
identified, but it wasn't possible to determine why the door blew off the ruptured
autoclave. An incident of this magnitude calls for serious evaluation. All steam
sterilizers at are being identified and evaluated. Each unit will be registered with the
State and periodic inspections and maintenance will be conducted. This event, as it turned
out, rocked the institution in a generally positive way.
Autoclave Scalding (top)
Post-doc Scalded when using Tower-Style Autoclave (top)
A postdoc, Dr. X, was scalded by water while removing items
from the top autoclave of a tower-style autoclave. The autoclave was determined to be
working properly at the time of the incident.
To autoclave her own materials, Dr. X began to remove a load that
belonged to another laboratory while standing on a step-stool. The load in the autoclave
consisted of a nalgene tub that contained liter bottles of media with water around them.
The water in the tub was near boiling temperature as Dr. X attempted to remove it, and the
contents spilled down the trunk and thighs of Dr. X. Another employee had gone to retrieve
a cart so that the materials could be removed more safely.
Findings: Factors contributing to the Accident
1. Style/Model of the Autoclave: The tower
style autoclave is more dangerous than a standard autoclave. Removing a load from the top
autoclave requires standing on a step-stool or platform ladder and stepping down to place
the load on a cart. For a short-statured person, a standard step stool is not high enough
to allow them to remove a load without reaching over their head. (Note: A standard step
stool was used in this incident.) In addition, the bottom autoclave is too low for a
tall person to comfortably insert or remove loads.
The facility has appropriate platform ladders in place to allow
individuals of different heights to reach the top autoclave. They are bulky, however, and
personnel are probably more likely to use a step stool. Facility had not required that
liquid loads be autoclaved in the bottom unit before the accident because of ergonomic
considerations for tall people. However, since the accident, liquid loads are permitted
only on the bottom.
2. Training Issues: Despite having attended
a recent training session where the participants were brought to the autoclave room and
given detailed safety instructions, Dr. X failed to:
a) remove glassware one by one before removing tubs from the top
autoclave
b) wear a lab coat (but was wearing autoclave gloves)
c) wait 10 minutes from the time the door is cracked open to allow
time for sufficient cooling
d) have cart available.
The other user of the autoclave failed to add no more than 1"
of water ( to prevent breakage of glass vessels.)
3. The autoclave log had not been filled in by
the previous user: Dr. X was removing a load of whose contents she was unfamiliar
with. If the log had been completed, she could have asked the owner to remove his/her
load.
4. Nalgene tubs were used instead of metal tubs:
Dr. X indicated that the nalgene tub had buckled. The Nalgene tubs may get less sturdy
as they age and may soften when exposed to intense heat.
Lab personnel may prefer using 5" nalgene tubs because they are
deeper than the metal tubs and more likely to catch boilover from flasks. However,
according to Steris, the nalgene tubs should not be used. The steam compresses the air in
the tray, creating an insulation pocket, which interferes with sterilization. Furthermore,
the use of the nalgene trays creates a need to use water in the tubs to fill the
insulation pocket.
5. Adding Water to the Tub: According to
Steris, only 50% of autoclave users add water to their autoclave tubs. As mentioned in 4
(above) this water may not be necessary if metal tubs are used. It is believed that adding
water to the tub prevents glassware from breaking during sterilization. According to
Steris, breakage should not be a problem if sturdy glassware is being used.
6. First Aid: Apparently, Dr. Xs burns
were worse in areas that were covered by underwear which was not removed. Removal of all
clothes covering affected skin should be stressed and tyvex labcoats should be readily
available for emergencies.
Additional Recommended Follow-up
a. The Health and Safety Office is exploring the possible use of a
hydraulic cart that could be used to take tubs out of the autoclave without the need to
bend down or climb a platform ladder.
b. The Health and Safety Office will work with the lab to evaluate
if autoclaving loads without water causes glass breakage.
c. Aprons,should be easily accessible in autoclave rooms. Signs
should be posted about what personal protective equipment must be worn.
d. The Health and Safety Office will inform lab personnel of the
incident and how it could have been prevented through training sessions, signage and a
newsletter article. The Health and Safety Office will increase emphasis on autoclave
safety in initial and refresher laboratory safety training sessions.
e. The Health and Safety Office strongly recommends that tower-
style autoclaves not be installed in any future buildings or renovations.
Steam Release (top
Two Steam Releases in Autoclave
Room Due to Lack of Backflow Preventer, Shorting of Safety Switch,
and Configuration of Steam Generators (top
EHS was notified of two steam release incidents from an autoclave room after the second
release. There are two sets of tower style autoclaves in the rooms. There are also 2 steam
generators, also situated one on top of the other.
The first release was due to boiling water/steam from the top steam generator which had
back-flowed into the piping which connects the DI water generator and the steam-generator.
The 3/4 inch PVC pipe melted, causing steam/boiling water to leak out. Immediately
afterwards Engineering installed a backflow preventer and replaced the melted pipe
with a stainless steel pipe.
A week later there was a steam release from the mechanical over-pressure safety valve
of the lower steam generator. Steam was released horizontally at a height of 3.5 feet. It
was determined that an over pressure condition in the lower steam generator caused this
release. The over pressure should have been avoided by the automatic activation of an
electrical safety pressure switch which controls the amount of pressure in the steam
generators chamber. However, the electrical switch had gotten wet during the
previous weeks steam release and this had shorted it out.
Findings and Recommendations
1. Steam release/ electrical hazards from stacking of the generators
There are significant safety hazards caused by having one generator stacked on top of
the other. These are being immediately separated.
- Water from the top unit, can drip right onto the high voltage electrical panel of the
bottom unit causing an electrical hazard.
- Water dripping from the top unit can drip onto the bottom units safety switchs and
valves causing them to fail. As seen in this incident, this can lead to an over pressure
condition.
2. Steam is directed at an unsafe location. Possibility of steam
filling the room in the event of a release from the safety relief valve
When steam was released from the pressure relief valve during the second incident, the
valve directed the steam to shoot out at a 3.5 foot height which could burn or people in
the room during a release. There is also a possible asphyxiation hazard. The autoclave
technician recommends that the pressure relief valve should be connected directly to a
drain to prevent this possibility.
3. Electrical Hazards from accessible high voltage controls
The panel which covers high voltage electronics on each steam generator is currently
unlocked on the generators. These must be securely closed and locked.
4. Servicing Area Partitioning the front and back of the autoclaves
There is currently no room behind the autoclaves and generators to allow access to
service the units. Following the steam release from the safety relief valve, the only way
that Engineering had to access the back of the autoclaves was to make holes in the wall
between the autoclave room and the adjoining conference room. .
The room is going to be expanded to allow for a partition wall and a servicing area
behind the autoclave. To minimize the chance of injury from steam, the steam generators
are being unstacked and relocated behind this partition.
5. Back-flow Check Valve
Engineering has recently installed a stainless steel check valve to prevent backflow of
boiling water/steam into the utility line which leads from the DI water. Engineering is
checking to ensure that there is a valve for the bottom generator and will install one if
necessary.
6. Overcrowding in the Room
The autoclave area is very cramped making it infeasible to use carts effectively. There
is no room to pass by if a person is working at the autoclaves or if the autoclave door is
open or if someone is working at the drying oven. This condition increases the risks of
burns. This situation will be alleviated by the expansion of the room.
7. Emergency Steam Shut Off
There are currently two switches labeled "safety switch" located on the wall
opposite the autoclaves. No one knows what is the purpose of these switches or what they
control. This information should be obtained. If the steam generators will remain in the
autoclave room there must be an emergency switch in the room which can be activated at the
far end of the room to shut off the steam source to allow personnel to exit the room in
the event of an emergency. Alternatively, an emergency exit should be provided out of the
far end of the room.
8. Training
Lab personnel will receive appropriate training in safety and
ergonomic measures when autoclaving.
Revision Date: 11/18/2001
url: http://www2.umdnj.edu/eohssweb/aiha/accidents/autoclave.htm
|