Laboratory Safety Incidents: Infectious Agents
Anthrax (top)
Live Anthrax (Rather Than
Killed) Sent to A California Hospital Laboratory
J.D. Miller, The Scientist - 6/11/04
US Lab is Sent Live Anthrax:
Incident at Oakland, Calif., Children's Hospital Research Lab Exposes Seven Workers
Medical News Today 6/1//-04
Anthrax, Live
Samples Sent to Oakland Hospital For Children by Mistake, Workers Exposed
R Veseley and I Hoffmann, The Argus - 6/12/04 -
Anthrax
Scare Underscores Research Safety
Suspected
Cutaneous Anthrax in A Laboratory Worker --- Texas, 2002, 2002 Morbidity and Mortality
Weakly Reports (MMWR) April 5, 2002 / 51(13),279-281
Bloodborne Pathogens
Investigator Exposed to Infectious
Material in Cryotube Explosion(top)
Key Instruction Points:
1. Be aware of the potential for
pressurization
when working with cryogenic liquids.
A researcher at a university reported that a vial of potentially
infectious materials "exploded" when she removed it from liquid nitrogen.
As you may have guessed, the "explosion" occurred when the
liquid N2 that has leaked into a vial expands when removed from the cold. This used
to be a fairly common problem with heat-sealed glass ampules, because it was difficult to
obtain perfectly fused glass with no microscopic holes. This problem was largely
resolved with laboratories began using plastic cryovials with a silicone seal. Nunc*
makes a sleeve called CryoFlex that slips over the vial and then is heat-sealed to keep
the liquid out. However, even with this type of product an explosion infrequently
occurs.
There are several ways to prevent this from happening:
1. Cryogenic storage vials are designed for VAPOR PHASE
STORAGE in liquid nitrogen freezers. This means that they are designed to sit in the
cloud of extremely cold nitrogen gas that sits just above a small reservoir of liquid
nitrogen in the bottom of the freezer. Leakage of liquid nitrogen into the vial
occurs with the freezer is overfilled and the vials are immersed in liquid nitrogen.
This problem can be avoided by not overfilling the freezers with liquid nitrogen.
2. Visually check each cryovial prior to filling to ensure
there are no defects around the rim. Cryovials should never be re-used.
3. When removing samples, pause for a moment in the neck of
the dewar before bringing them into the room atmosphere - if one is going to pop, it will
usually do so early in the warm-up process.
The importance of gloves and face shield can not be overemphasized.
Tubes stored in liquid phase dewars, where the ampules are in canes is especially
hazardous. Since nitrogen freezers tend to be located separate from the labs, full
face shields and gloves should be available near the nitrogen freezers so no one is
tempted to pull a vial without protection because they forgot to bring a shield with them.
Information about Nunc products is at: http://nunc.nalgenunc.com/products/catalog/handling/index.html
Ebola (top)
Russian
Scientist Dies in Ebola Accident at Former Weapons Lab New York Times Archive abstract, May 25, 2004
Foot and Mouth Disease (top)
Final report on potential breaches of biosecurity at the Pirbright site 2007, Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom
Following the outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Surrey on 3 August, the UK government asked the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to lead an investigation
into biosecurity issues at the Pirbright facility a site occupied by the Institute of Animal Health (IAH) and also by two private companies called Merial Animal Health Ltd (Merial) and Stabilitech Ltd (Stabilitech). The Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) had established that the virus strain causing FMD in the first infected herd of cattle at a farm in Normandy, Surrey was O1 BFS67 (also known as 01 BFS1860 and hereafter referred to as O1 BFS). This is a laboratory strain not naturally found in the environment and was one upon which work was being carried out by all three occupants of the Pirbright site ahead of the first outbreak. HSEs job was to lead a team to investigate:
- potential breaches of biosecurity at the Pirbright site;
- whether such breaches may have led to a release of any specified animal pathogen;
- whether any such breaches had been rectified to prevent future incidents.
Meningococcal Disease (top)
Laboratory-acquired
Meningococcal Disease - United States, 2000 Morbidity and Mortality Weakly
Reports (MMWR) February 22, 2002 / 51(07);141-144
Resources (top)
Laboratory- and some other
Occupationally-acquired Microbial Diseases. A bibliography along with related source books and publications,
C. H. Collins, BOKU University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Institute
of Applied Microbiology, Vienna, 1999
Sabia Virus in
Centrifuge Incident (top)
Key Instruction Points
1. Vacate room and wait at least
30 minutes for
infectious aerosols to settle before attempting a
clean-up
2. Use sealed rotors or safety
cups when
centrifuging blood, pathogens or other
potentially infectious materials.
3. Written emergency procedures
should be
clearly defined for potential accidents/incidents
that can occur in the lab..
4. All personnel should be
trained in emergency
procedures when using hazardous materials.
A few years ago the newly discovered arenavirus, Sabia, was being
studied by a visiting senior virologist, who was purifying it from 1 litre of tissue
culture fluid. At the time of the incident, the virologist was working alone in the
biosafety level3 laboratory (negative pressure with HEPAfiltered exhaust system). The
researcher used a high speed centrifuge with a large angle head centrifuge rotor with six
new plastic bottles in the purification process. During the centrifugation cycle there was
a nasty rattling sound that indicated a problem. As soon as the unit stopped, he opened
the chamber and removed the bottles from the rotor and placed them in a biological safety
cabinet..Only then did he realize that one of the plastic bottles had leaked about 100 ml
of infectious tissue culture into the centrifuge rotor. (Subsequently a hairline crack was
found.)
The researcher was probably exposed to aerosolized Sabia virus when
he opened the chamber. He immediately disinfected the centrifuge rotor, the defective
bottle and the centrifuge using 10% Clorox solution. He cleaned the spilled material from
the centrifuge while wearing a gown, surgical mask, and gloves. After disinfecting the
centrifuge and bottles, he continued to work in the laboratory for 3-4 more hours.
He did not inform anyone or report the incident.
About 10 days later he went to the doctor with a 4 day history of
fever, malaise, backache, stiff neck, and myalgias that he attributed to another cause.
The diagnosis of Sabia Virus was made and confirmed. Although Sabia virus infection is
potentially fatal, the researcher recovered after 2 weeks of treatment.
Persons who came into contact with the researcher or with his
biological specimens in the hospital laboratories were notified and enrolled in a
surveillance program. None of these persons developed the virus.
Analysis
After this incident, the CDC classified Sabia Virus
as a BL4 pathogen, which requires use of a glove box or containment suit.
Personnel who work with BL2 or higher mateirals must receive annual
training in biosafety which should include how to recognize a potential exposure incident
and procedures to follow in an emergency. Personnel working with higher level
organisms need additional training.
Blood, other potentially infectious material and pathogens must only
be centrifuged using a sealed rotor or safety cups. These must be opened in a
biological safety cabinet.
If there is any incident which creates aerosols of an infectious
material, the room should be evacuated and the material allowed to settle for at
least 30 minutes before any clean-up activities are undertaken. The incident should be
reported as an emergency to the Health and Safety Office. Possible personnel exposures
should be treated as a medical emergency. The Health and Safety Office must evaluate
the need for respiratory protection and other personal protective equipment before
clean-up is performed.
SARS (top)
Biosafety and
SARS Incident in Singapore September 2003, Report of the Review Panel on New SARS Case
and Biosafety, Singapore Ministry of Health
CDC Health Advisory: Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, December 17, 2003, 2:00 PM ET
Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, December 17, 2003, World Health
Organization
Summary of the
Discussion and Recommendations of the SARS Laboratory Workshop 22 October 2003,
World Health Organization
Tularemia (top)
Report of Pneumonic Tularemia in
Three Boston University Researchers, Boston Public Health Commission
Vaccinia (top)
Ocular Vaccinia Infection in
Laboratory Worker, Felicia M.T. Lewis, et al., Philadelphia, 2004, Emergeing
Infectious Diseases, Vol. 12, No 1. January 2006
West Nile Virus (top)
Laboratory-Acquired West Nile
Infections, United States, 2002, MMWR Weekly, December 20, 2002, 51(50);1133-1135
Disclaimer
Revision Date: 1/6/2006
url: http://www2.umdnj.edu/eohssweb/aiha/accidents/infectious.htm
American Industrial Hygiene Association
2700 Prosperity Ave., Suite 250
Fairfax, VA 22031
(703) 849-8888 (703) 207-3561 fax
|
